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Note
"A Dangerous Undertaking": The
Problem of Intentionalism and Promise
of Expert Testimony in Appropriation
Art Infringement Cases
Monika Isia Jasiewicz*
"It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
in the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits." - Justice Oliver Wendell Holmesi
INTRODUCTION
In May 2011, a federal district court issued a ruling that shocked the
art world. In a copyright infringement action against prominent artist
Richard Prince,2 Judge Deborah Batts of the Southern District of New
York dispensed the art world equivalent of the death penalty: an
injunction requiring that artworks be "deliver[ed] up for impounding,
* Yale Law School, J.D. 2013; Princeton University, A.B. 2010. Huge thanks to Amy Kapczynski for
her tremendous guidance in advising this paper, as well as to the staff of the Yalejournal of Law
& the Humanities (particularly Shouvik Bhattacharya) for their editorial assistance. I am grateful
to Hal Foster for providing me with the vocabulary to write about appropriation art and
encouraging me long ago to keep my interest in art alive in my legal career. Special thanks to
Allyson Bennett for being my writing buddy and sounding board. Finally, as always, to my
parents, without whose encouragement this paper could not have come about
1. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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destruction, or other disposition."3 The condemned works-a series
of Prince collages titled "Canal Zone"-contained photographs from
Yes, Rasta, a book of portraits of Jamaican Rastafarians by the
photographer Patrick Cariou.4 Prince had cut out images from the
book and painted over them, combining them in his collages with
other original and found images.5 The court held that by using images
from Yes, Rasta, Prince infringed Cariou's copyrights, and his work did
not qualify for the fair use defense.6
Two years later, in April 2013, the Second Circuit reversed Judge
Batts's decision, holding that several of Prince's images constituted
fair use and remanding the remainder of the photocollages for further
consideration by the district court.7 The Second Circuit's decision is a
landmark ruling on a problem that has plagued American intellectual
property law for some time: how copyright law should handle
appropriation art, the genre of contemporary visual art that takes
preexisting images from pop culture, media, or other artists and
incorporates them into new works.8 Yet despite the case's high profile,
the Second Circuit missed an opportunity in Cariou v. Prince. By
refusing to define a clear standard for when appropriation art
constitutes fair use, the Second Circuit has left the state of copyright
law in this realm muddled. Most troublingly, it leaves in place a major
problem in courts' current treatment of the fair use question in
appropriation art cases: courts' overreliance on artists' testimony.
As the Second Circuit acknowledged, the district court in Cariou v.
Prince based its conclusion "in large part" on Prince's deposition
testimony.9 Prince testified in early stages of litigation that he had no
real interest in the meaning behind Cariou's work, and that he took
Cariou's images as "raw material" for his own artistic production.o
Prince refused, in short, to articulate a reason for taking Cariou's
works, stating instead that he simply liked the photographs. Many
viewed this testimony as "fatal" to Prince's defense,11 prompting the
3. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
4. Id. at 343-44.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 353-54.
7. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
8. Compare Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding fair use in an
appropriation art case), with Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding an
appropriation artwork infringing), Friedman v. Guetta, No. CV 10-00014 DDP (JCx), 2011 WL
3510890 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (same), and United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F.
Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same).
9. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
10. Cariouv. Prince, 785 F. Supp. 2d 337,349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
11. Rachel Corbett, Cariou Fights on Copyright Appeal, ARTNET (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/corbett/cariou-versus-prince-1-25-12.asp ("Prince
plainly, arrogantly, and perhaps fatally, said in district court that he had no real interest in the
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court to view his appropriation as theft rather than as fair use.
This is not the first time that an artist's failure to articulate the
meaning behind his appropriation has resulted in a court siding
against him. One need only think of the famous pair of appropriation
art cases: Rogers v. KoonS12 and Blanch v. Koons.13 In the former case,
the artist Jeff Koons was unable to articulate why he had selected the
plaintiffs photograph to adapt in sculptural form. The Second Circuit
held Koons liable.14 In Blanch, on the other hand, Koons testified as to
why he selected a fashion photographer's images to incorporate into
his painting and how his use was transformative-and the court
looked upon his testimony favorably, holding that Koons had
demonstrated fair use.ls
This paper argues that this phenomenon-whereby appropriation
artists are forced to verbally advance a particular interpretation of
their own work in order to claim fair use-is contrary to current
trends in art theory. Even more problematically, it has serious First
Amendment consequences. The problem arises because courts are
notoriously unwilling to weigh in on matters of aesthetics and artistic
meaning.16 Rather than reaching independent conclusions about fair
use, therefore, courts require appropriation artists claiming the
affirmative defense to explain why they have appropriated another's
images. By forcing artists to articulate their intent, courts are not
staying out of the business of making artistic judgments, as they may
hope that they are.17 On the contrary, courts are taking sides in a
running debate in the art theoretical community about whether
artists or critics should be the ones to interpret artworks-a debate
which tends to disfavor the artist's own statement of intent.18 While
many have criticized courts for not understanding the
transformativeness inherent in appropriation art, it appears that no
commentators have thus far identified the particular irony of using
meaning behind Cariou's work....").
12. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1991).
13. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
14. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308-09.
15. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 259.
16. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to constitute themselves final judges
of the worth of pictorial illustrations...."); see also Christine Haight Farley, judging Art, 79 TUL.
L. REv. 805 (2005) (criticizing the "doctrine of avoidance" of aesthetic judgments).
17. See Farley, supra note 16, at 813 (describing the principle of "aesthetic non-
discrimination" in copyright law).
18. This trend toward disfavoring artists' own interpretations is closely associated with the
"death of the author" in postmodern art and literary theory. The two seminal works in this vein
are ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT (Stephen Heath trans., Hill &
Wang 1977) (1967), and MICHEL FOUCAULT, What Is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER (Paul
Rabinow ed., Josub V. Harari, trans., Pantheon 1984) (1969). See infra Part II.
2014] 145
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artists' testimony to substitute for aesthetic judgment, or the
particular harms that this trend produces.
At first blush, the Second Circuit's opinion in Cariou v. Prince
appears to make progress on the issue of intentionalism in
appropriation art cases, by acknowledging that Prince's statements
are not dispositive on the question of fair use.19 Rather than relying
exclusively on artists' testimony, the Second Circuit explained, courts
should look to "how the work in question appears to the reasonable
observer, not simply what an artist may say about a particular piece
or body of work."20 Yet as I will explain, because the Second Circuit
failed to instruct courts on how exactly to handle artistic testimony,
there remains the threat that courts will default back on
intentionalism. Furthermore, the "reasonable observer" standard is
unworkable in the context of appropriation art, which requires
informed reading for viable interpretation.
This paper proceeds in six Parts. In Part II below, I provide a brief
primer on contemporary appropriation art in order to demonstrate
how the genre advances artistic progress. Next, in Part III, I explain
why licensing breaks down in the context of appropriation art, and
how courts handle the consequent infringement actions in this arena.
As I explain in Part IV, this status quo is troubling from both an art-
theoretical and a First Amendment perspective. In Part V, I propose
that courts should invite expert testimony on the question of whether
an artistic use is "transformative" in a way that would qualify for the
fair use defense.21 Currently, expert testimony on fair use is not
strictly speaking inadmissible, but it has been criticized as irrelevant
because transformativeness is typically evaluated from the
perspective of the ordinary observer.22 If transformativeness were
evaluated from the perspective of the art "expert" or critic, however,
two (in my view, positive) results would follow: (1) courts could rely
on expert testimony and would not be tethered to artists' own
interpretations of their work in a way that stands in tension with
contemporary art theory; and (2) "transformativeness" would expand
to include transformations in meaning that trained art critics-but
not necessarily uneducated observers-can recognize, thereby
broadening the First Amendment safeguard of fair use in
appropriation art cases.
19. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013).
20. Id.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
22. See Denise Cote, Making Experts Count, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 223, 236-37 (2011).
146 [Vol. 26:143
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11. A BRIEF PRIMER ON CONTEMPORARY APPROPRIATION ART
Introductory courses in art history often begin with a discussion of
a hackneyed slogan: "Good artists borrow; great artists steal." It is
fitting, in a way, that the phrase's origins are unclear; perhaps the
words originate with Pablo Picasso, or maybe with T.S. Eliot,23 or
possibly with Igor Stravinsky.24 Regardless of where the phrase was
born, it has now been so often repeated and copied that it is part of
our cultural landscape.25 The appropriation artist's project is
embodied in both the content and the widespread dissemination of
"Good artists borrow; great artists steal." The appropriation artist
takes from the landscape of images and phrases in which we live,
quoting from it and recontextualizing what he has quoted.26
While elements of appropriation can be found in a variety of artistic
practices-not only in the visual arts, but also in music27 and
literature-I wish to focus here on a particular brand of
appropriation: the contemporary visual artist's use of existing images
in his own works. As the history of this genre reveals, contemporary
appropriation art is not premised on rote copying. Rather, it is about
quotation, recontextualization, and criticism-the very building
blocks of artistic progress.
Today's appropriation art traces its origins to the development of
modernism, when the act of copying first began to take on a critical
tenor. Nineteenth-century traditions conceived of imitation as a
means to an end, a practice whereby an artist would arrive at his own
original style.28 "In contrast," art critic David Evans has explained,
"modernist copying is not a means to this end. It is the end."29 This
shift was registered in, among others, Pablo Picasso and George
23. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 552 n.73 (2004).
24. See Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli, I Collage, Therefore I Am: An Introduction to
Cutting Across Media, in CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA: APPROPRIATION ART, INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 1, 1 (Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli eds., 2011).
25. This is so even within the world of law review articles. See, e.g., Debra L. Quentel, "Bad
Artists Copy. Good Artists Steal.": The Ugly Conflict Between Copyright Law and Appropriationism,
4 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 39 (1996).
26. In a 2001 addition to the Oxford English Dictionary, the specific art-historical usage of
the term "appropriation" is defined as "the practice or technique of reworking the images or
styles contained in earlier works of art, esp. (in later use) in order to provoke critical re-
evaluation of well-known pieces by presenting them in new contexts, or to challenge notions of
individual creativity or authenticity in art"
27. Appropriative music is particularly significant in that it has played a key role in the
development of copyright fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569 (1994) (holding that rap music group 2 Live Crew's song "Pretty Woman," a parody of Roy
Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman," qualified for the fair use defense as commercial parody).
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Braque's cubist collages of 1912-13,30 which incorporated
newspapers, musical scores, and drawing scraps, thus manipulating
signs through their displacement and combination.31
While the Cubists manipulated the images with which they worked
to a considerable degree, a 1912 work by Marcel Duchamp presaged
the later contemporary practice of copying images wholesale. In a
painting titled "L.H.O.O.Q.," Duchamp painted a moustache onto
Leonardo da Vinci's storied Mona Lisa. He also inscribed the image
with its homonymic title, which, in French, sounds like the phrase
"elle a chaud au cul," meaning "she's got a hot ass." Duchamp's use of
the Mona Lisa was not quite parody, not quite mimicry. Instead,
Duchamp played with the traditions of painting, using the iconic
image as a sign that he manipulated and teased.32
The notion of images as signs developed significantly in mid-
twentieth-century art theory. While artists once focused on
mimeticism, postmodern artistic practice shifted toward semiotic33
forms of representation, in which artists took signs from the world
around them and used them to construct new meanings.34 In semiotic
practice, artists use images as "signifiers" of real-world "referents,"
treating signs as their raw material. By the 1960s, many artistic
movements went from using linguistic or invented signs-as was
common in the practice of the Dadaists3s or Lettristes36-to using
borrowed images from the world around them, especially the
distinctive imagery of consumer culture.
This shift was particularly pronounced in the work of a French
movement called Situationism. Guy Debord, the Situationist leader,
published his landmark text The Society of the Spectacle in 1967, in
which he argued that social life has turned into a "spectacle" of
commodity imagery, from advertising to mass media.37 This concept is
fundamental to the postmodern practice of appropriation because, as
30. See John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 103,108-09 (1989).
31. See Rosalind Krauss, 1912: The Cubist Invention of Collage, in 1 ART SINCE 1900:
MODERNISM, ANTIMODERNISM, POSTMODERNISM, 1900 TO 1944, 112, 112 (Hal Foster et al. eds., 2004).
32. Carlin, supra note 30, at 109.
33. The term "semiotic," as it is used in art-theoretical discourse, comes from the work of
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. See generally FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL
LINGUISTICS (Roy Harris trans., Open Court 1983) (1972) (laying out Saussure's "Semiology," or
theoretical approach to linguistics based on the concepts of sign, signifier, signified, and
referent).
34. See Carlin, supra note 30, at 110.
35. See generally THE DADA PAINTERS AND POETS: AN ANTHOLOGY (Robert Motherwell ed., 1951)
(compiling original and secondary source materials about Dadaist art).
36. See generally DAVID SEAMAN, CONCRETE POETRY IN FRANCE (1981) (providing an overview of
Lettriste practice).
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John Carlin has explained, "the referent in post-Modern art is no
longer 'nature,' but the closed system of fabricated signs that make up
our environment.... In the present century culture functions as the
ideal artistic referent."38 In other words, where an artist once painted
a landscape, he now constructs a compilation of the pre-existing
images and signs that saturate our visual environment. Consider, for
instance, the works of Jasper Johns,39 who incorporated newspaper
scraps into his 1954 painting "Flag,"40 or Andy Warhol, who openly
appropriated trademarked commercial images in his silk-screens of
Campbell's soup cans and sculptures of Brillo pad boxes.41
Around the same time that copying became a semiotic enterprise,
traditional notions of "originality" and "authenticity" came under
attack as art and literary theorists began to question prior
conceptions of authorship. Traditionally, artists themselves have been
seen as bearing primary responsibility for the interpretation of their
own works. As Ernst Gombrich wrote in his canonical Story of Art,
"every one of [an artwork's] features is the result of a decision by the
artist," so that the artist is accountable for every aspect of his
creation.42 This viewpoint can be called "intentionalism," or the belief
that the meaning of a work is determined by the artist's intentions.
Postmodern art, however, actively challenges this base assumption
by questioning the traditional conception of the author as the
romantic figure that creates original works. This challenge is
associated with two seminal essays in postmodern criticism: Roland
Barthes's 1967 The Death of the Author, as well as Michel Foucault's
1969 What Is an Author?.43 In broad terms, Barthes and Foucault both
argue against intentionalism, arguing instead that the text and the
author are unrelated, and that critics should interpret a text on its
face. Barthes in particular challenged the premise that the author is
the creator of an "original" work, arguing instead that the author
merely compiles signs that already exist in the world:
The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable
centres of culture.... [T]he writer can only imitate a gesture
that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix
38. Carlin, supra note 30, at 111.
39. Martha Buskirk, Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and Fair Use, 60 OCTOBER 82, 100
(1992).
40. See Jasper Johns, Flag, MUSEUM OF MODERN ART,
http://www.moma.org/collection/objectphp?objectid=78805 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
41. Carlin, supra note 30, at 111. Appropriation of trademarked signs raises a separate set of
legal issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.
42. ERNST GOMBRICH, Introduction: On Art and Artists, in THE STORY OF ART 32 (16th ed. 1995);
see also Sherri Irvin, Appropriation and Authorship in Contemporary Art 45 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS
123, 126 (2005) (quoting Gombrich).
43. BARTHES, supra note 18; FOUCAULT, supra note 18.
2014] 149
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writings, to counter the ones with others, in such a way as
never to rest on any one of them.44
In other words, Barthes's "author" may more properly be termed an
"appropriator."
Postmodern author-appropriators emerged in full force in the
1970s with the so-called "re-photographers," including Sherrie
Levine, Cindy Sherman, and Barbara Kruger, as well as Richard
Prince.45 During this period, the preferred technology of
appropriation artists became photography rather than collage, and
with this technological shift the romantic notion of the "artist's hand"
left the artwork, thus further challenging traditional notions of
originality and authenticity.46
Perhaps the most provocative of the re-photographers was Sherrie
Levine, who took the practice of appropriation to a new and radical
level in the 1980s. Levine re-photographed book plate reproductions
of works by well-known artists such as Walker Evans, Alexander
Rodchenko, and Kasimir Malevich and presented them as her own
work.47 Levine's "After Walker Evans" series of 1981 has become so
emblematic of appropriation art that, in a radical act of what one
might call "meta-appropriation," the artist Michael Mandiberg created
a website in 2001 titled AfterSherrieLevine.com, which appropriates
Levine's images by making them available for viewers to print out
from the Internet.48 Levine's "re-photographs" are, on one level, the
faithful reproduction of a real-life referent: Levine wrote in 1984 that
she considered herself "a still-life artist-with the book plate as my
subject."49 On another level, as the critic Rosalind Krauss has pointed
out, the re-photographed series function as "collages," in which the
appropriated image, taken from the pages of an art book, "acquires
along with its status as a readymade, the reified condition of the
object."so
Crucially, Levine's appropriative gestures are also deeply critical of
the original works that they reproduce. As the critic Hal Foster has
explained, Levine's re-photographs are a critical "re-presentation of
modern art works."s Levine's appropriation "reframe[s] the
44. BARTHES, supra note 18, at 146.
45. John C. Welchman, Introduction: Global Nets, Appropriation and Postmodernity, in ART
AFTER APPROPRIATION: ESSAYS ON ART IN THE 1990s 1,4 (John C. Welchman ed., 2001).
46. See Heather J. Meeker, Comment, The Ineluctable Modality of the Visible: Fair Use and
Fine Arts in the Post-Modern Era, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 195, 215 (1993).
47. See Irvin, supra note 42, at 125; Welchman, supra note 45, at 10-11.
48. AFTERSH ERRIELEVINE.COM, http://aftersherrielevine.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
49. Welchman, supra note 45, at 11 (quoting Sherrie Levine).
50. Id. (quoting Rosalind Krauss).
51. HAL FOSTER, RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL POLITICS 36 (1985).
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conventional image of the artist-as expressionist,"52 thus commenting
on the nature of Walker Evans's work and authorship even as she
challenges its originality.53
As Levine's work reveals, contemporary appropriation art finds its
theoretical foundations in a very different realm from plagiarism or
piracy. Levine does not appropriate Evans's iconic photographs
because she wishes to create images of the Great Depression. Instead,
her appropriation is a form of "criticism" or "comment"-types of use
that are supposed to be privileged in fair use analysis,54 though as will
be explained below, the fair use defense does not always apply to
appropriation art.55
Furthermore, as the history of appropriation art reveals, the
practice of appropriation is fundamentally aimed at challenging and
departing from prior modes of representation. In fact, the practice of
contemporary appropriation artists is the sort of innovative criticism
and reassessment of our environment that one might argue the
Copyright Act is designed to protect. Copyright's constitutional
mandate is, after all, "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."56 If "[p]rogress" is central to copyright's mission, surely the
paradigm shift from mimetic to semiotic representation, and the
accompanying rise of appropriation as a novel form of artistic
meaning-making, should fall within its aims.57 As it turns out,
however, copyright doctrine has not wholeheartedly embraced
appropriation as the sort of work it is supposed to protect-or even
tolerate.
III. How COURTS HANDLE APPROPRIATION ART INFRINGEMENT CASES
Although it may be valuable and progressive as an artistic strategy,
appropriation stands in obvious tension with copyright law. As a
threshold matter, one might argue that appropriation art is
52. Id.at72.
53. Krauss has described Levine's work as an "explicit deconstruction" of modernist and
avant-garde notions of originality. ROSALIND KRAusS, The Originality of the Avant-Garde, in THE
ORIGINALITY OF THE AVANT-GARDE AND OTHER MODERNIST MYTHS 151, 168 (1985).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) ("[T]he fair use of a copyright work... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright.").
55. See Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial Control
over Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 93, 110 (1994) ("The argument for fair use
across the spectrum of art appropriation is so weak that even appropriation art advocates cabin
their arguments significantly.").
56. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
57. See, e.g., Xiyin Tang, That Old Thing, Copyright...: Reconciling the Postmodern Paradox in
the New Digital Age, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 71 (2011) (arguing that copyright doctrine that denies the
legitimacy of postmodern art forms, particularly so-called "remix culture," defies the Copyright
Clause's mandate "to promote the Progress of Science.")
2014] 151
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fundamentally opposed to the basic value premises of copyright,
which maintain that "original[ity]" is central to the notion of
"authorship," or at least to the ownership of a monopoly right in
artwork.s8 Appropriation artists, in contrast, actively disavow
traditional notions of originality.59 Their original contribution lies not
in the creation of the image itself, but in its manipulation.60 Given that
appropriation artists collect preexisting images rather than creating
their own, one might wonder whether appropriation artworks
themselves qualify as "original works of authorship" warranting
copyright protection.61
This paper focuses on a narrower question: how courts should
handle cases in which an original artist sues an appropriator for
copyright infringement. Since Section 106 of the Copyright Act makes
reproducing a copyrighted work the exclusive province of the
copyright holder,62 appropriation art clearly "violates the letter, if not
the spirit, of intellectual property law."63 What is more, the Copyright
Act also grants copyright holders the exclusive right to make
derivative works,64 defined as:
work[s] based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted65
The derivative works right might seem-again, in letter if not
spirit66-to bar the production of appropriation art entirely. Yet the
relationship of copyright and appropriation art is complex, since
appropriation is not theoretically premised on copying or plagiarism,
but rather on quotation, recontextualization, or even criticism-in
other words, the sorts of activities that in other contexts fall within
58. According to Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, copyright protection extends to
"original works of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). The Supreme Court has interpreted
this phrase to require "independent creation plus a modicum of creativity." Feist Publications v.
Rural Tel. Serv., 494 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Irvin, supra note 42, at 123 (arguing that although appropriation art appears "to
support the view that authorship in art is an outmoded or misguided notion," appropriation
artists actually reaffirm the concept of authorship in art by "revealing that no aspect of the
objectives an artist pursues are in fact built into the concept of art."); see also Carlin, supra note
30, at 110 (describing Warhol's contributions as "more on the order of manipulation than on the
creation of original imagery").
61. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
62. Id. § 106.
63. Carlin, supra note 30, at 105.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
65. Id. § 101.
66. Carlin, supra note 30, at 105.
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the realm of the fair use defense.67
It is unsurprising, then, that appropriation art spurs a hotbed of
copyright litigation, particularly because appropriation artists, by the
very nature of their artistic endeavor, are unlikely to seek licenses for
their appropriative uses.68 As explained above, much of the value of
appropriation art comes from its critical tenor-a quality that would
be eradicated or at least compromised if appropriation artists copied
works with the original author's permission. A license might act as an
implied "stamp of approval," leading the viewer to infer that the
appropriator's criticism of a work bears its original author's
imprimatur. Permission thus weakens the effectiveness of
appropriation as a strategy for critical discourse. In addition, licenses
may be costly for appropriation artists to obtain, and original authors
may have unequal bargaining power over potential licensees. Since
copyright holders contain monopoly rights in their works, they may
capitalize on their monopoly by driving up the price of a license.
Appropriation artists may not have the financial resources to obtain
such costly licenses,69 or they may meet resistance from copyright
holders who refuse to grant licenses for uses that they view as
critical.70 Finally, appropriation artists with some knowledge of fair
use doctrine may assume that they do not need to acquire licenses-
and incur the real and transaction costs associated with doing so-
because they view their appropriations as transformative in nature
and thus privileged in fair use analysis. For instance, the artist
Shepard Fairey, whose "Obama Hope Poster" was the subject of an
infringement action by the Associated Press, has stated that he did not
seek a license for the AP photograph that he appropriated because he
"did not think [he] needed permission to make an art piece using a
reference photo.... [T]he photograph is just a starting point. The
illustration transforms it .... "71
Given the art-theoretical, economic, and psychological barriers to
licensing in the appropriation art context, it is unsurprising that
infringement actions against appropriation artists are common. Yet
the case law on these actions is less extensive than one might expect,
67. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
68. See William W. Fisher Ill et al., Reflections on the Hope Poster Case, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
243, 313 (2012) ("In the past, a large proportion of the artists working in [the appropriation art]
tradition have not obtained licenses from the owners of the copyrights in the materials that they
appropriate. With some frequency, those copyright owners have brought suit (or threatened to
bring suit) against the artists.").
69. See id. at 275 ("For many artists, even licensing an image is not financially feasible.").
70. See William M. Landes, Copyright Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art: An Economic
Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) ("Parody can involve high transaction costs due to
the difficulty of negotiating with someone at whom you wish to poke fun.").
71. Fisher et al., supra note 68, at 274.
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because artists frequently settle disputes out of court.72 One
prominent example is a case involving the appropriation artist Robert
Rauschenberg. The photographer Morton Beebe sued Rauschenberg
after the artist used one of Beebe's photographs in a collage print.73
Rauschenberg and Beebe settled the case for $3,000, and
Rauschenberg gave Beebe the original copy of the collage, which was
worth about $10,000.74 Notably, Rauschenberg did not admit to any
wrongdoing, specifically stating that he "never felt that [he] was
infringing on anyone's right."75 He offered a settlement because
neither party wanted to endure the costs of litigation.76
Rauschenberg is not the only artist to settle an infringement case
out of court while believing that he has made a fair use of a
copyrighted image. Other prominent examples include Andy Warhol,77
David Salle,78 and most recently, Shepard Fairey.79 The prevalence of
settlement in this area arises in large part because, as this Part will
explain, the outcomes of copyright infringement actions in the
appropriation art context are context-sensitive and difficult to
predict.80 Even the same artist can be held liable for infringement in
one suit and let off in the next, as in the case of Roger Koons discussed
below.81 As I will argue, the deciding factor in this inquiry often turns
out to be the artist-defendant's own testimony, in large part because
courts are unwilling to make aesthetic judgments themselves and
prefer to leave this task to the authors of artistic works.
A. Transformative Fair Use
Before turning to the specific problem of courts' overreliance on
artists' testimony, some doctrinal background on copyright
infringement is warranted. In order to bring a successful action for
72. See id at 313-14.
73. Rachel Isabelle Butt, Appropriation Art and Fair Use, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL 1055,
1067-68 (2010).
74. Landes, supra note 70, at 4 n.10.
75. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ALBERT E. ELSEN, & STEPHEN K. URICE, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL
ARTS 563-64 (5th ed. 2007) (quoting letter from Robert Rauschenberg to Morton Beebe).
76. Butt, supra note 73, at 1068.
77. Landes, supra note 70, at 4 n.10 ("Warhol paid $6,000 cash and royalties on the print
edition of Flowers to the photographer Patricia Caulfield who had threatened to sue Warhol over
his flower paintings.").
78. Buskirk, supra note 39, at 101 (recounting how the artist David Salle settled a suit
brought by collaborative graphic artists Cockrill and Hughes for his appropriation of their
drawing).
79. See Fisher et al., supra note 68, at 268.
80. See Butt, supra note 73, at 1069 ("In the few cases that have gone to trial, there is no
consistency in the holdings to provide guidance to artists or courts, which illustrates that judges
do not know what is fair use in the visual arts.").
81. See Section Ill.C infra (discussing Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) and
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he owns a
valid copyright in the work at issue; and (2) that the defendant has
copied that work or original aspects of that work.82 In appropriation
art cases, these elements usually are not difficult to establish, because
appropriation artists deliberately copy protected elements of other
copyrighted works. As a result, appropriation art cases tend to hinge
on the affirmative defense of fair use.
Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that fair use, including "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... ,
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."83 The
statute outlines four factors that courts should weigh in determining
whether or not the fair use defense applies:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature ... ; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market or value
of the copyrighted work."84
Interestingly for appropriation art cases, the final factor includes the
effect of an infringing use on the market for authorized derivative
works, meaning that a sculptural version of the photographic image
contained on a postcard, for instance, can be held to adversely affect
the potential market for the original image, despite the fact that
sculpture and photography are different mediums.85
As it turns out, however, fair use outcomes in appropriation art
cases most frequently hinge not on the existence of derivative
markets, but rather on the question of transformativeness. In
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., a landmark case dealing with
appropriation in pop music, the Supreme Court held that
"transformative" uses are favored under the first statutory fair use
factor and are furthermore assumed to have a lesser adverse effect on
the potential market for the original copyright holder's works.86 The
Campbell Court explained that the key question to be considered
when determining whether a use is transformative is whether it
"merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
82. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (2012).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
84. Id.
85. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1991).
86. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.");
see also Tushnet, supra note 23, at 544 (stating that transformative uses "are assumed to be less
likely to damage the copyright owner's markets").
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altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."87 Since
Campbell, courts have increasingly required elements of
transformation-that is, of new material or new meaning
(particularly critical meaning)-to be present in a work in order for
defendants to claim fair use.88 A 2000 study found that in all but one
of the thirty-eight lower court fair use opinions issued in the six years
following Campbell, "the courts' determinations regarding
transformative use have correlated to their overall decisions
regarding fair use."89
The centrality of transformativeness in fair use inquiry has been
(perhaps rightly) criticized by scholars such as Rebecca Tushnet, who
has argued that equating fair use and transformativeness has negative
First Amendment consequences because it penalizes valuable forms of
non-transformative copying.90 As a practical matter, however, the
emphasis on transformativeness and the influence of Campbell are all
but inextricable from fair use determinations in the appropriation art
context. While it may seem as if a strong correlation between
transformativeness and fair use should make it easier to predict
infringement outcomes, the truth is that the question of whether or
not an appropriation is transformative is a difficult one to answer.
Embedded in the concept of transformativeness are a whole host of
secondary issues, both economic and aesthetic. On one hand, the
Campbell Court justified its emphasis on transformativeness in
economic terms, conceiving of fair use as a means to combat market
failure in licensing.91 As Justice Souter explained, "the unlikelihood
that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or
lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very
notion of a potential licensing market."92 Transformative uses-
particularly parodies or other critical appropriations-are thus less
likely to be licensed, so fair use can step in as a corrective mechanism.
At the same time, however, Justice Souter also justified the
87. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
88. See Tushnet, supra note 23, at 550 ("[Flair use increasingly requires
transformation....").
89. Jeremy Kudon, Note, Form over Function: Expanding the Transformative Use Test for Fair
Use, 80 B.U. L. REV. 579, 583 (2000). Notably, the one case that departed from the trend, Castle
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), was
subsequently rejected by the Second Circuit, which reversed the transformative use
determination to correlate with the overall fair use decision. Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v.
Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1998). See Kudon, supra, at 583 n.28.
90. Tushnet, supra note 23.
91. The market failure rationale for fair use is associated with a large body of literature, the
full reach of which is beyond the scope of this paper. The canonical work in this realm is Wendy
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and
Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
92. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
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transformativeness test in loftier constitutional terms. He explained
that this emphasis on transformativeness is intended to further the
fundamental goal of copyright, to promote "Progress": "[T]he goal of
copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by
the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart
of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing room within the
confines of copyright...."93 In this sense, transformativeness is
associated not only with the failure of licensing markets, but also with
the notion of artistic progress and with First Amendment values.
Indeed, transformative uses that alter the original "with new
expression, meaning, or message"94 expand the so-called "marketplace
of ideas" and may be considered fair uses for this reason alone.
In the context of appropriation art specifically, the various notions
embedded within the transformativeness inquiry tend to push courts
to make aesthetic judgments and interpretations, regardless of
whether they conceive of fair use as an economic concept or a
mechanism for promoting artistic production. This is so because, as
has already been explained, it is most likely that the licensing market
will fail when the appropriation artist's project is critical in nature.
Deciding whether an appropriation is critical and thus unlikely to be
licensed is an interpretative exercise that requires the trier of fact to
decipher the purpose and meaning of the appropriation. In
constitutional terms, meanwhile, the outcome of an appropriation art
infringement case will depend in large part on whether or not a court
finds that a given appropriation is the sort of transformative,
progress-promoting work that the Copyright Act is intended to
support. This decision likewise requires some degree of critical and
aesthetic evaluation.
B. Courts'Reluctance To Make Aesthetic Judgments
Given that fair use is such a subjective matter, it should come as no
surprise that determinations of fair use in the context of
appropriation art involve a degree of aesthetic judgment. If the
availability of the fair use defense is intimately tied to copyright's goal
of promoting progress, then it becomes quite easy for the concept of
fair use to blur together with the notion of artistic worth. Yet for a
variety of reasons, courts are unwilling to enter the business of
evaluating works on their aesthetic merits-or at least they say they
are.
No discussion of courts' reluctance to make aesthetic judgments can
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begin without invocation of Justice Holmes's oft-cited warning: "It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."9s As
John Carlin has noted, Justice Holmes uttered this phrase in a context
that dealt with copyrightability rather than infringement96-and yet,
"the underlying idea that judges should remain sensitive to aesthetic
criteria that they may not completely understand or agree with
remains relevant in the context of whether appropriation should be
considered a fair use or an infringement."97 Since Justice Holmes first
made this canonical statement in 1903, courts have applied it in
contexts dealing with non-visual art as well, establishing "a broad
nondiscrimination principle, such that copyright should not make
judgments about artistic value."98
Yet the fact that Justice Holmes made his statement in the context of
visual art is particularly significant for appropriation art cases, as it
suggests that there is something special about images that places
them beyond the reach of ordinary judicial interpretation. Tushnet
has suggested that courts tend to view images as either entirely
transparent, meaning that they are an accurate reflection of reality
whose meaning is obvious and not susceptible to interpretation, or
entirely opaque, meaning that they are impossible to interpret
because images are somehow not suited for discussion and analysis.99
Courts' vacillation between the two extremes arises in large part due
to the expectation that courts will articulate their determinations
verbally, as well as their consequent reliance on modes of textual
rather than visual criticism.100
Christine Haight Farley has identified a number of additional
reasons why courts tend to avoid aesthetic judgment, premised on a
series of conventional understandings: "First, art and law belong in
separate cognitive and intellectual spheres. Second, art and law exist
in polarity where law is objective and art is subjective. Third, law is
about precedent whereas art is about the evolution of ideas."101 These
95. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
96. The question in Bleistein concerned whether advertisements could be considered "art"
for the purposes of copyright protection. Id at 239.
97. Carlin, supra note 30, at 103 n.3.
98. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV.
683, 712 (2012).
99. Id. at 687.
100. Id. at 688 ("[F]air use, a crucial limit on copyright's breadth, is presently hampered by
the model of textual criticism, which makes visual fair uses harder to identify or explain. The
baseline expectation that text will be the unit of analysis confounds our ability to work with
other creations.")
101. Farley, supra note 16, at 807.
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assumptions, however, break down in the realm of fair use, where
aesthetic judgments are inevitable, or at the very least where the law
must reach objective answers to subjective questions.102 Technically,
resolving a copyright infringement case should not involve the sort of
purely aesthetic determination that goes into deciding whether or not
an object has "art status," meaning that it qualifies as a work of art,
because copyright protection vests in "original work[s] of authorship"
rather than "works of art."103 Yet, as I have already explained,
determinations of an object's value as art often "operate below the
surface" in fair use inquiry.104
Nevertheless, because courts hold themselves out as objective
institutions that stay out of the business of aesthetics, judges have
arrived at a variety of avoidance techniques to escape artistic
interpretation.os These techniques include making automatic
decisions about an object's art status without including supporting
analysis1o6 and deferring to secondary evidence without explaining
how it proves the object's art status.107 In the context of appropriation
art, courts rely on one avoidance technique in particular: using an
artist's statement of intent as a stand-in for judicial aesthetic
interpretation.
C Role of the Artist's Testimony in Fair Use Determinations
Because courts are loath to make aesthetic judgments on their own,
they frequently defer to artists' own statements of intent when
evaluating fair use claims in appropriation art cases. In fact, all three
appropriation art cases to have reached the circuit court level-all of
which happen to come from the Second Circuitlo8-were decided with
reference to authorial intent. In a famous pair of cases, Jeff Koons's
ability or inability to articulate why he had appropriated a particular
image turned out to be outcome-determinative. In Cariou v. Prince,
meanwhile, Prince's perceived aloofness initially presented a major
obstacle to his defense. And although the Second Circuit displayed
some willingness to look beyond Prince's deposition testimony, its
102. See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL L. REv. 247, 301
(1998) ("[T]he existence of copyright makes subjective judicial pronouncements of aesthetic
taste necessary.").
103. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
104. Farley, supra note 16, at 805.
105. Id at 836.
106. See id. at 838 (describing cases where courts "either made conclusions about the
artwork's meaning or about whether the artist's contributions were artistic," and stated these
conclusions "flatly, as if self-evident").
107. Seeid.at837.
108. This count includes only cases dealing with visual appropriation art, not those
addressing practices of appropriation in other media such as music.
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stated approach is likewise problematic from an art theoretical
perspective.
1. The Koons Cases
Two cases, separated by a span of fourteen years, have brought
artist Jeff Koons to the fore of the appropriation art debate. In Rogers
v. Koons,109 a widely criticizedilo pre-Campbell case from 1992, the
Second Circuit held Koons liable for copyright infringement. In the
2006 case of Blanch v. Koons, meanwhile, Koons's work qualified for
the fair use defense.111 In each case, Koons's testimony played a
central role.
Koons's work, which has been the subject of both praise and
criticism in the art world,112 follows in a strand of the appropriation
art tradition that traces back to the Pop Art of the 1960s. Unlike
Levine, for instance, who appropriates images by well-known artists
in order to challenge traditional notions of authorship, Koons's
appropriation practice is focused on more pedestrian and banal
images, particularly images from consumer culture. His work is thus
connected with the critical theory of commodity and the Pop Art
legacy of depicting consumer culture. The critic Hal Foster has coined
the term "commodity sculpture" to describe Koons's most famous
works, sculptural renderings of appropriated consumer images that
treat their subject as a sort of readymade, "collaps[ing] high art and
commodity culture programmatically."113
In Rogers, the photographer behind a black-and-white postcard
image of a couple and their eight German Shepherd puppies sued
Koons after he created a three-dimensional, colored rendering of the
image as one of his signature commodity sculptures.114 In a deposition
early on in the litigation, Koons stated, rather brazenly, that he had
not sought permission from Rogers to copy his work because, in his
view, the "Puppies" postcard "[was] not art.... It is something that is
reproduced over and over again to penetrate into a culture.... It is
just part of the public domain."115 In other words, Koons stated
explicitly that he saw "Puppies" as a commodity.
109. 960 F.2d 301 (1992).
110. See, e.g., A. Michael Warnecke, The Art of Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: The
Postmodern-Art Challenge to the Copyright Law, 13 REV. LITIG. 685 (1994) (arguing that Rogers
was wrongly decided).
111. 467 F.3d 244 (2006).
112. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304 ("He is a controversial artist hailed by some as a 'modern
Michelangelo,' while others find his art 'truly offensive."').
113. HAL FOSTER, THE RETURN OF THE REAL: THE AVANT-GARDE AT THE END OF THE CENTURY 108
(1996).
114. Id.
115. VILLIS R. INDE, ART IN THE COURTROOM 15 (1998) (quoting Koons's deposition testimony).
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To the layperson, Koons's testimony may seem to dodge the
question of why he appropriated Rogers's work. Yet the fact that
Koons saw "Puppies" as a commodity is the statement that "String of
Puppies" embodies. Koons described the "Puppies" postcard as an
example of "visual excess" in society.116 By appropriating Rogers's
image, Koons treated it as a referent, manipulating its signification to
comment on a world of visual excess-or, as Koons's artistic ancestors
would call it, the "society of the spectacle."117
In an action for copyright infringement, however, Koons's
deposition testimony did him no favors. Koons admitted to actual
copying, and he did not provide either a clear verbal justification for
why he selected Rogers's image to copy, or how his use of Rogers's
work was transformative or critical. In holding against Koons, the
district court zeroed in on the fact that "Koons concede[d], as he must,
that he 'used' Rogers' photograph 'Puppies' as 'source material for his
sculpture 'String of Puppies."'118 While the court acknowledged that
"Koons prefers to avoid the verb 'copied,"' it concluded that
"[s]emantics do not decide the issue" and held Koons liable.119
The Second Circuit also examined Koons's testimony when it
affirmed the district court's holding. Koons had argued that his
sculpture was properly understood as a satire or party, explaining
that
he belongs to the school of American artists who believe the
mass production of commodities and media images has caused
a deterioration in the quality of society, and this artistic
tradition... proposes through incorporating these images into
works of art to comment critically both on the incorporated
object and the political and economic system that created it.120
Yet, although the Second Circuit "accept[ed] this definition of the
objective of this group of American artists,"121 it did not accept that
Koons's appropriation constituted criticism or commentary for
purposes of the fair use defense. In so holding, the Second Circuit
drew a distinction between satire, which criticizes society at large,
and parody, which aims its criticism at the appropriated work. The
court concluded that "even given that 'String of Puppies' is a satirical
critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to discern any parody
of the photograph 'Puppies' itself."122
116. Id. at 16 (quoting Koons's deposition testimony).
117. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
118. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
119. Id.
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One wonders what might have happened if Koons had explained
more specifically why he had appropriated "Puppies" instead of just
describing the appropriation art tradition in which he worked.
Perhaps Koons simply gave the court the wrong narrative when he
described the context of his work rather than explaining why
"Puppies" should be the target of his appropriative practice. It is
naturally impossible to know what would have happened had Koons
explained that "Puppies" was an exemplar of the commodity-filled
visual environment that he sought to criticize-though Blanch v.
Koons may provide some clues.
In Blanch, the Second Circuit held that Koons's work qualified for
the fair use defense when he incorporated the plaintiff's photograph
into a transformative collage painting.123 The work at issue was a
photograph of a woman's feet wearing Gucci sandals, taken for the
fashion magazine Allure. Koons scanned the image and incorporated it
in a collage of women's feet dangling over images of confections, with
Niagara Falls in the background.124
As he had done in Rogers, Koons again provided the court with a
narrative, this time in the form of an affidavit. But rather than
discounting Blanch's work as commonplace, as he had done with
Rogers's photograph, Koons explained that he saw Blanch's image as
an exemplar of the society that he criticized. He also explained why he
chose to copy Blanch's image rather than painting a pair of women's
legs himself:
By using a fragment of the Allure photograph in my painting, I
thus comment upon the culture and attitudes promoted and
embodied in Allure Magazine.... [I]n order to make statements
about contemporary society and in order for the artwork to be
valid, I must use images from the real world. I must present
real things that are actually in our mass consciousness.125
In other words, Koons provided a statement of artistic intent that
justified his appropriation of Blanch's image as necessary to his
artistic strategy.
Quoting extensively from Koons's affidavit, the district court
granted him summary judgment, finding that Koons's work qualified
as "transformative."126 The Second Circuit agreed, and like the district
court, it relied heavily on Koons's affidavit.127 The Second Circuit was
123. Blanch v. Koons, 437 F.3d 244 (2006).
124. Id. at 247-48.
125. Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 475,481 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Koons's affidavit).
126. Id. at 482.
127. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2006) (quoting Koons's affidavit as support for the
court's conclusion that "[t]he sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch
had in creating, 'Silk Sandals' confirms the transformative nature of the use").
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persuaded by the way in which Koons articulated his intent in
appropriating the image, namely to prompt the viewer to contemplate
his or her own experience with advertising images.128
In a concurring opinion, Judge Robert Katzmann made a point of
distinguishing Blanch from Rogers, in which, he contended, "Koons
slavishly recreated a copyrighted work in a different medium without
any objective indicia of transforming it or commenting on the
copyrighted work."129 Interestingly, however, neither Judge Katzmann
nor the Blanch majority indicated what the "objective indicia" of
transformation in the "Niagara" painting might be. On the contrary,
the only evidence of transformativeness to which the Second Circuit
pointed was Koons's testimony explaining the purpose and necessity
of his appropriation.
2. Cariou v. Prince
At first blush, the Second Circuit's recent decision in Cariou v. Prince
appears to signal a departure from the testimony-based approach to
fair use inquiry that emerged in Rogers and Blanch. The district court,
in keeping with the tradition of the Koons cases, had relied heavily on
Prince's statements of intent when it ruled against him.13o It focused
in particular on portions of Prince's testimony that suggest that his
appropriation did not aim commentary or criticism at Cariou's work:
"Prince testified that he doesn't 'really have a message' he attempts to
communicate when making art. In creating the Paintings, Prince did
not intend to comment on any aspects of the original works or on the
broader culture."1is Based on this testimony, Judge Batts concluded
that "Prince did not intend to comment on [Cariou's work]... and
Prince's own testimony shows that his intent was not transformative
within the meaning of Section 107."132 In other words, Judge Batts
considered the question of transformativeness entirely from the
perspective of Prince's statements of authorial intent, rather than
reaching an independent judgment about the transformative value of
Prince's work.
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit not only reversed Judge
Batts's holding, but also took issue with her approach. Writing for the
Court, Judge Barrington Daniels Parker, Jr., refused to "hold Prince to
his testimony" alone, stating that "the fact that Prince did not
provide... explanations in his deposition-which might have lent
128. Id.
129. Id. at 262 (Katzmann, I., concurring).
130. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F.Supp. 2d 337, 340-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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strong support to his defense-is not dispositive."133 Instead, Judge
Parker explained,
What is critical is how the work in question appears to the
reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say about
a particular piece or body of work. Prince's work could be
transformative even without commenting on Cariou's work or
on culture, and even without Prince's stated intention to do so.
Rather than confining our inquiry to Prince's explanations of
his artworks, we must instead examine how the artworks may
"reasonably be perceived" in order to assess their
transformative nature.134
Judge Parker's opinion went on to undertake an analysis remarkable
in appropriation art cases: independent aesthetic interpretation.
Judge Parker concluded that all but five of the challenged thirty
artworks were transformative as a matter of law, making reference to
the "crude and jarring" nature of Prince's work compared with
"Cariou's serene and deliberately composed photographs" to support
his argument that "Prince's composition, presentation, scale, color
palette, and media are fundamentally different and new compared to
the photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince's work."135
Judge J. Clifford Wallace, meanwhile, wrote a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which he stated that he
would remand all thirty works for further consideration by the trier of
fact.136 "I see no reason to discount Prince's statements as the majority
does," Judge Wallace stated, though he also noted that "perhaps new
evidence or expert opinions will be deemed necessary by the
factfinder."137
Taking the opinions in Cariou v. Prince together, the Second Circuit
did signal some shift away from the persistent reliance on artists'
testimony in earlier appropriation art cases. Yet the ruling remains
problematic in two different ways. First, the Second Circuit provided
no clear guidance on how artists' testimony should factor into courts'
fair use inquiries, and indeed there was disagreement on the court as
to whether artists' testimony should be relevant and if so, to what
degree.
Second, the "reasonable observer" standard is problematic on its
own, because purely visual interpretation of appropriation artworks
is just as distressing from an art theoretical standpoint as
133. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013).
134. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994)).
135. Id. at 706.
136. Judge Wallace is a Ninth Circuit judge who sat by designation on the Cariou panel. See
id. at 694.
137. Id. at 712-13 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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intentionalist interpretation. Although the reasons for this are
discussed in greater detail in Section V.A below, the main issue with
pure visual interpretation is immediately apparent from the
disposition of the Cariou case. The court decided definitively that
twenty-five of the thirty artworks at issue qualified as fair use, but it
remanded five more works for further consideration by the district
court. Specifically, Judge Parker explained that these five works
contain "relatively minimal alterations" to Cariou's photographs and
held that "it is unclear whether these alterations amount to a
sufficient transformation of the original work of art such that the new
work is transformative."138 Judge Parker described the visual
characteristics of these five works and concluded that because the
apparent alterations that Prince made were not optically dramatic, he
could not conclude whether or not they were truly transformative,
despite his acknowledgment that Prince's alterations "unarguably
change the tenor of the piece."139 The limitations of visual analysis
caused Judge Parker to draw an essentially arbitrary distinction
between twenty-five "fair uses" and five "question marks." As Bob
Clarida put it, Judge Parker's purely visual approach thus "sort of de-
conceptualizes the art and treats it as merely a bunch of marks on a
surface-very old-timey and reductionist."140
Cariou v. Prince, then, leaves courts today in an uncomfortable
position. On one hand, Judge Parker's approach invites courts to
undertake independent artistic interpretation. This mode of analysis
would mark a complete departure from a century's worth of case law,
including Supreme Court case law, maintaining an aesthetic
nondiscrimination principle in copyright.141 On the other hand, Judge
Wallace's harshly worded dissent warns against this shift, stating that
he would be "extremely uncomfortable" conducting independent
aesthetic interpretation "in my appellate capacity, let alone my limited
art experience."142 Moreover, the purely visual approach to
interpretation that Judge Parker embraced has its own shortcomings,
as it leads to potentially arbitrary distinctions and is itself out of sync
with contemporary art theory. In short, the Second Circuit provided
no clear indication of where the proper balance lies between
138. Id.at711.
139. Id
140. Donn Zaretsky, What You See Is What You See, THE ART L. BLOG (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/what-you-see-is-what-you-see.html (quoting Bob
Clarida); see also id. ("If not a jury, you could program a scanner to do it: 88% optically similar is
infringement, 38% optically similar is fair use.").
141. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994); Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
142. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 714.
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independent visual analysis and reliance on artists' testimony. Courts
are left between Scylla and Charybdis: either they should take the leap
toward Justice Holmes's "dangerous undertaking" of aesthetic
judgment,143 or they should fall back on overreliance on artists'
testimony. Either approach has problems, as I will now explain.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS QUO
Courts' current treatment of appropriation art infringement cases
has been widely criticized, in large part because copyright doctrine in
this realm seems to be so fundamentally incompatible with the aims
of contemporary appropriation artists. So far, however, commentators
have failed to recognize the particular harms that arise when courts
rely on artists' narratives to substitute for their own aesthetic
evaluation in fair use inquiry.
The fact that the proxy of authorial intent in fair use inquiry has not
been commented upon is problematic, because the practice is ill-
suited to appropriation art cases in two distinctive ways. First, when
courts rely on artist-defendants' testimony, they are not actually
avoiding making an aesthetic judgment, as they may hope they are. On
the contrary, courts are actually taking sides in a debate in the art
theoretical community about appropriate interpretative agents for
contemporary art, and doing so in a way that is contrary to the
theoretical premises of appropriation.
Aside from injecting themselves into art world debates, courts also
run the risk of abridging First Amendment values when they make fair
use determinations on the basis of authorial narrative alone. Fair use
is a First Amendment safeguard built into the copyright system. When
courts locate appropriation artists outside of the bounds of fair use,
appropriation artists' free speech rights may be infringed. In addition,
by forcing artists to verbally articulate why they have appropriated
certain images in order to be able to claim the fair use defense, courts
relegate visual art to a lower position in the speech hierarchy, thus
disadvantaging artists who prefer to operate in visual media alone.
The freedom of speech implies the freedom to choose a medium and
means of expression.144 Yet in the appropriation art context, copyright
law not only places limits on the particular images that an artist can
use, it also forces artists to depart from their chosen medium of visual
expression in order to be able to justify potentially infringing uses.
143. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
144. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (reversing a man's conviction for
wearing a jacket bearing the phrase "fuck the draft" and explaining that "we cannot indulge the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process").
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A. The Art World Debate over Interpretative Agents and the "Death of
the Author"
By relying on the proxy of artists' intent in the interpretative
aspects of fair use inquiry, courts unintentionally espouse a
specifically intentionalist view on the art theoretical question of who
should be the final arbiter of artistic meaning. As I already explained
above, however, appropriation artists operate in the shadow of the
"death of the author" and changed notions of authorship and
interpretation.145
It is no surprise, then, that many appropriation artists disclaim
intentionalism and espouse the death of the author instead. Levine,
for instance, actually appropriated phrases from The Death of the
Author in a written "Statement" on her artistic practice that appeared
in Style magazine in 1982.146 And Prince himself has actively
disavowed intentionalism. In a 1984 interview, the artist Peter Halley
observed that Prince's works seem to come from different points of
view. Halley then asked Prince, "[I]s it possible to conduct an
interview with you? Because what voice would address me?" Prince
responded: "I don't think it's necessarily important to have a
particular point of view. Whether you believe me or not, isn't
important."147
It also bears noting that the rise of appropriation art coincided with
the development of a particular brand of art criticism. At the very
moment when the re-photographers arrived on the scene in the late
1970s, the influential journal October came into being. In fact, it was in
the pages of October-founded by the critics Rosalind Krauss, Jeremy
Gilbert-Rolf, and Annette Michelson-that many of the key ideas
associated with postmodern appropriation "first found their sustained
expression."148 Currently active appropriation artists have, in other
words, always worked in the shadow of art criticism; their works
consciously, if not actively, seek out the interpretation of trained
critics and observers.
And yet courts require appropriation artists to be the ones to
articulate the intentions and meanings behind their work in order to
claim that their uses are transformative. Courts may hope that by
doing so, they are staying out of the business of aesthetics altogether.
Yet courts treat artists' testimony in an intentionalist way whenever
they use it as the foundation upon which to judge whether a work is
145. See Part II supra.
146. See Sherrie Levine, Statement, in APPROPRIATION 81 (David Evans ed., 2009).
147. Richard Prince, Interview with Peter Halley, in APPROPRIATION 83 (David Evans ed.,
2009).
148. Welchman, supra note 45, at 10.
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transformative in a way that "adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new
expression, meaning, or message."149 And by treating artists'
testimony in an intentionalist way, courts are not only taking sides in
the art world debate over interpretative agents; they are taking what
the artists at issue would consider to be the wrong side.
One might object that the artists' intentions should be relevant to
the fair use inquiry, if only with regards to the market failure
rationale. If fair use is intended to fill in the gaps where licensing is
impossible, the artist's intention may be relevant because the artist is
the negotiator, and thus best suited to speak to the question of
whether or not acquiring a license would be possible. Yet the artist's
intent is not necessarily a good proxy for what the other party to the
licensing agreement-the original creator of the copyrighted work-
would understand of the potential use. Therefore, the artist's
statement of intent will not necessarily accurately reflect what the
bargaining conditions surrounding a potential license might have
been, since the original artist's interpretation of the appropriated use
is relevant to this inquiry as well. Furthermore, fair use serves not
only to correct licensing failure between the original parties, but also
to broaden the First Amendment safeguard built into copyright law
and to signal to other potential appropriators what sorts of unlicensed
uses are permitted. Under this broader view of fair use doctrine's
purposes, the appropriation artist's intent is actually not as significant
as viewers' interpretations of his use.
B. First Amendment Considerations
Aside from standing in tension with contemporary art theory,
courts' current treatment of appropriation art also implicates First
Amendment concerns. Copyright law and the First Amendment
operate on a sliding scale: any monopoly right to an artwork limits the
freedom of expression, and any expansion of free speech rights adds
to the marketplace of ideas and, ultimately, to the public domain. On
one hand, copyright is "the engine of free expression,"so a system
meant to incentivize creative production by giving authors monopoly
rights to their works. It is the "supply side" of the First Amendment.
On the other hand, however, copyright contains certain "built-in First
Amendment accommodations" intended to temper monopoly speech
rights-first and foremost of which is fair use.1s1
There are at least two ways in which the current state of the law on
149. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,579 (1994).
150. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,191 (2003).
151. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct 873, 876 (2012) (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219).
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appropriation art raises First Amendment concerns. First, whenever a
court rules against an appropriation artist, it limits the artist's ability
to contribute to the marketplace of ideas through his chosen strategy
of meaning-making. On the micro level this may mean that a
particular artist is enjoined from displaying or continuing to make a
particular type of work; on the macro level, it may produce chilling
effects that will hamper future appropriation artists.152 Second,
because courts rely on artists' testimony as a proxy for independent
judicial interpretation, courts currently tend to privilege artists skilled
in both visual and verbal expression and disadvantage artists who
prefer to work through visual means alone.
Appropriation is, in many ways, central to the values that the First
Amendment seeks to protect.153 Jack Balkin has stated that freedom of
expression depends on people's ability to "participate in culture
through building on what they find in culture and innovating with it,
modifying it, and turning it to their purposes."154 As Roxana Badin has
observed, appropriation is a form of expression all its own:
[T]he very act of appropriation operates as language with
which creators speak to and about their audiences. Such
communication takes on an interactive dimension that has led,
in many cases, to a more direct relationship between the
creative arts and popular culture, inevitably increasing the
public's exposure to the arts.155
In this sense, appropriation is a subcategory of speech, and as such it
is entitled to First Amendment protection and even esteem as a public
good.
The threats to freedom of expression that arise when courts define
fair use too narrowly are well documented elsewhere. Lawrence
Lessig and Jed Rubenfeld, among others, have warned that heightened
copyright protection for original works can create chilling effects on
creative production, disincentivizing transformative uses that would
be socially valuable.156 Naturally, it is difficult to measure chilling
152. Naturally, the chilling effects will be tempered if licensing is possible; however, as I
have already explained, there are many barriers that stand in the way of licensing in the
appropriation art context. The chilling effects might also be mitigated if the law operated on
liability rules and damages only, instead of injunction; however, the current state of the law
makes injunction a very real possibility, as the district court's disposition of Cariou v. Prince
illustrates. See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
153. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOx 43 (2008) ("Appropriation lies at the
heart, not the margins, of freedom of speech.").
154. Id. (quoting Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004)).
155. Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative Value:
Appropriation Art's Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1653,
1655 (1995).
156. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY
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effects empirically, so it is hard to tell whether current fair use
doctrine actually dissuades appropriation artists from producing
works incorporating copyrighted images. Commentators have argued,
however, that the doctrine's lack of clarity will necessarily result in
chilling effects.157 The trend toward settlement, moreover, seems to
indicate that many artists are not willing to take the risk of litigation
when there is so much uncertainty inherent in the law. This insecurity
is particularly acute given courts' lack of confidence in making
aesthetic determinations. For instance, Fairey has stated that he
settled the AP's suit against him because he was "concerned that the
judge and potentially the jury would not have a sufficiently
sophisticated understanding of either art or copyright law to judge in
[his] favor."158
Aside from large-scale chilling effects, the trend toward
intentionalism in copyright infringement actions has another
consequence that abridges First Amendment values: it privileges
artists' verbal explanations of their intentions over their visual work.
Tushnet has linked this tendency to a psychological concept called
"verbal overshadowing," whereby verbal descriptions alter an
individual's perception of images.159 Verbal overshadowing can be
such a powerful force that different courts contemplating the same
copyrighted images can be said to literally "s[ee] different works"
depending on how those works were described to them.16o Although
the Rogers and Blanch courts did see different works, they were, after
all, works by the same artist, employing the same fundamental
strategy of appropriation. The difference between the two cases, as I
have argued, arose from the artist's testimony and from the verbal
overshadowing effects that accompanied it. As Tushnet put it,
dependence on artists' testimony to justify fair use in visual art cases
"means that results may be unpredictable or idiosyncratic, depending
on whether the judge has-in Justice Holmes's text-focused words-
(2009); led Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1
(2002).
157. See Note, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1568 (1984)
("The absence of a definitive legal standard for appropriation of visual images results in a
chilling of freedom of speech interests. Artists will hesitate to experiment with creative modes if
such experimentation may result in liability for copyright infringement."). Although this
particular statement predates the Second Circuit case law on appropriation, as well as the
Supreme Court's decision in Campbell, its underlying logic remains sound. See also Lynne A.
Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-Modernism, 11 CARDOzo ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1992) (stating that Rogers v. Koons "ultimately acts to chill-rather than to
foster-creative expression, the very antithesis of the economic incentives at the heart of
copyright law").
158. Fisher et al., supra note 68, at 274.




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol26/iss1/4
Jasiewicz
'learned the new language in which [the artist engaged in fair use]
spoke."'161
This unpredictability can cause lopsided results, where visual
artists who are also talented wordsmiths are more likely to succeed in
claiming fair use. This trend relegates visual art to a lower position in
the speech hierarchy, subordinate to verbal explanations. From a First
Amendment perspective, such a development is fundamentally
undesirable, as freedom of expression implies freedom to choose
one's means of expression. This issue is particularly troubling given
that contemporary appropriation art has actually shifted toward
purely visual expression. Levine, for instance, published written
works describing the significance of her re-photographs;162 Prince and
others, on the other hand, have abandoned this practice. If artists such
as Prince are forced to verbally justify their work, this requirement
necessarily implicates First Amendment concerns.
V. PROPOSAL FOR TRANSFORMATIVENESS AS AN EXPERT QUESTION
Many of the preceding concerns about overreliance on artists'
testimony are difficult to address because they arise from the
combination of two doctrinal facts: the Supreme Court has never
articulated the perspective from which transformativeness is to be
evaluated, and fair use is an affirmative defense. Since the Supreme
Court has never stated whether transformativeness should be
considered from the viewpoint of a person skilled in art theory or an
ordinary observer, lower courts consider it from the artist-
defendant's perspective as a default, since the burden lies on the
defendant to prove that his use has been fair.163 To enable courts to
depart from their problematic reliance on intentionalism, I propose
that transformativeness be evaluated from the perspective of the
expert trained in art criticism. Expert testimony should be both
admissible and relevant in this inquiry, so that artist-defendants do
not need to be the agents of interpretation for their own work in
order to claim fair use.
A. Current Treatment of Expert Testimony in Copyright Infringement
Cases
Currently, expert testimony in copyright infringement cases is used
in a variety of ways, though courts and litigants frequently lack clear
standards for when it should be admitted and how it should be used.
161. Id. at 755 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
162. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 146.
163. NIMMER& NIMMER, supra note 82, at §13.05.
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Substantive copyright law, including the law on fair use, is largely
silent on the issue of expert testimony, with one significant exception:
the law on substantial similarity.
The Second Circuit's two-part test for substantial similarity,164 laid
out in Arnstein v. Porter, states specifically that expert testimony is
admissible on the question of probative similarity (i.e. whether or not
copying occurred as a factual matter), but irrelevant with respect to
the question of unlawful appropriation (i.e. whether the copying
constituted copyright infringement).165 The latter is subject to an
"ordinary observer" test.166
This analysis of proof may seem counterintuitive. Probative
similarity asks merely whether or not copying has occurred; this
seems to be the sort of question that a jury (or a judge faced with a
summary judgment motion) can easily answer based on seeing the
works at issue. The question of unlawful appropriation, on the other
hand, requires the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant
has copied copyrightable elements of the original work. This analysis
requires the trier of fact to separate out scenes a faire elements, for
instance, or features of the work that are dictated by necessity.167
Doing so could require or at least benefit from some knowledge of the
underlying art form; a photographer, for instance, would be more
likely to be able to tell which lighting choices were in a photographer's
control versus which ones were dictated by technological limitations.
The counterintuitiveness of the Arnstein test has prompted
commentators such as Mark Lemley to suggest that courts "ha[ve] the
analysis of proof exactly backwards-permitting analytic dissection of
the works and expert testimony where the question is one that should
be handed to the members of the jury, and falling back on the
'ordinary observer' test on the very questions that require careful
dissection by the court."168 Some courts have attempted to revolve
this issue, at least in part, by introducing a so-called "extraordinary
164. 1 do not discuss the Ninth Circuit's test here because the appropriation art cases that I
am concerned with have all been brought in the Second Circuit The Ninth Circuit's approach,
however, generally treats the analysis of proof the same way, though it uses different
terminology. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright
Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 719, 723 (2010) (describing the Sid & Marty Krofft test
as advancing "the same basic two-step approach" that appears in Arnstein).
165. 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
166. Id. Arnstein dealt with the copyright to a song, so it uses the term "ordinary lay hearer,"
but the Second Circuit has applied the Arnstein test to other forms of expression as well. See, e.g.,
Ringgold v. BET, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997); Laureyssens v. Idea Group, 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1992); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1986).
167. See Lemley, supra note 164, at 737-38.
168. Id. at 719.
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observer" test for particular forms of expression.169 A particularly
clear statement of this standard comes out of the Fourth Circuit:
When conducting the second prong of the substantial
similarity inquiry, a district court must consider the nature of
the intended audience of the plaintiffs work. If... the intended
audience ... possesses a specialized expertise, relevant to the
purchasing decision, that lay people would lack, the court's
inquiry should focus on whether a member of the intended
audience would find the two works to be substantially similar.
Such an inquiry may include, and no doubt in many cases will
require, admission of testimony from members of the intended
audience or, possibly, from those who possess expertise with
reference to the tastes and perceptions of the intended
audience.170
This specialized observer test does not quite turn unlawful
appropriation into an expert question, but it provides courts with
some flexibility to admit testimony about features of a work that
would not necessarily be obvious to a jury or to an untrained judge.
The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has used this test to admit background
on video games; in that context, it stated that unlawful appropriation
should be considered from the perspective of "a discerning 17.5-year-
old boy."171 In the appropriation art context, where artists often make
works with the critical establishment in mind,172 perhaps substantial
similarity should be considered from the perspective of the observer
trained in art criticism, since appropriation art's "intended audience"
is largely populated with such experts. One might object that this
reasoning is itself problematically intentionalist, since the artist's
intention is relevant to a determination that his "intended audience" is
a trained observer. It is crucial to note, however, that this reasoning
does not presuppose that the artist's intention is relevant to the
interpretation of his work. On the contrary, the artist is relevant in this
framework only insofar as his intentions define the audience of the
work, and not the work's meaning or purpose or whether his
appropriation qualifies as fair. Understanding the artist's intention to
be relevant to the definition of a work's audience is, in other words,
not outcome-determinative in an infringement action, and thus much
less problematic than overreliance on artists' testimony.
If courts should in fact invite the testimony of "extraordinary
observers" on the question of unlawful appropriation, they should
169. Id. at 730.
170. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990).
171. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204,209 (9th Cir. 1988).
172. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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almost certainly do so for the question of fair use. After all, a work can
be transformative in many ways, some of which may not be obvious to
the untrained eye. The Campbell Court stated that transformative uses
"alter[] the first with new expression, meaning, or message"173-a
definition that contemplates more than mere visual alteration of the
appropriated image. On the contrary, even Levine's re-photographs
may be considered transformative because they use Evans's images in
order to question traditional conceptions of authorship and not to
depict the Great Depression. To borrow a phrase from the law of
hearsay, Levine does not use Evans's images for "the truth of the
matter asserted";174 she uses them as quotations in a critical
commentary, thus repurposing them.
The trouble with transformation in appropriation art is that,
because it frequently does not rely on visual manipulation, it is not
always visible to the ordinary observer who has not, in Justice
Holmes's words, "learned the new language in which [the] author
spoke."175 Visual art is, in fact, a sort of language, requiring a degree of
visual literacy from its viewers. This is why art historians speak of
"reading" an image-a practice that requires the critical observer to
bring to bear some knowledge of formal, theoretical, and historical
context. Appropriation artworks may be particularly difficult for
uneducated observers to read because they intentionally re-code
referents as signifiers; in other words, they literally speak their own
language. The critiques inherent in appropriation artworks are thus,
in Louis Harmon's words, "ghosts which haunt the art object, but are
manifested nowhere on its surface ... visible only to the
cognoscenti."176
It may be that privileging the opinions of trained observers over
"ordinary observers" is problematic for the very same reason that
intentionalism is ill-suited as an interpretative mode for
appropriation art. After all, Barthes's "death of the author" is also
associated with the "birth of the reader." Perhaps the "ordinary
observer" standard would be appealing in light of this phenomenon.
Yet, as Harmon has noted, artists like Koons work within the confines
of their tradition, and viewers unfamiliar with that tradition should
not necessarily be trusted to make definitive judgments about
transformativeness where legal rights are at stake:
Behind Koons's use of another's image were ideas that
belonged solidly to the postmodern tradition ... the attack on
173. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,579 (1994).
174. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
175. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
176. Louise Harmon, Law, Art and the Killing]ar, 79 IOWA L. REV. 367,405 (1994).
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originality, on the model of the artist as genius, on the
separation of art from the rest of the mess we live in, on the
hermeneutical primacy of authorial intent.... To appreciate
their value, or at least to articulate their value, one must either
be a member of the artworld or perch on the edge of the
artworld long enough to catch a glimpse of what is going on.
Indeed, without a historical context in which to place these
objects, the strategies of appropriation look just like theft.177
Given that critical commentary is frequently "hidden" in
appropriation art, it seems natural to allow courts to consider expert
testimony on the question of whether the purpose and character of an
appropriation are transformative. Yet it seems that no court has ever
articulated a standard akin to the Arnstein test for whether or not
expert testimony is relevant in the fair use inquiry.
Expert testimony on the question of fair use is not strictly speaking
inadmissible, though it has been criticized as irrelevant. In Castle Rock
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., for instance, the
author and publisher of a book of trivia about the television show
"Seinfeld" offered expert testimony to demonstrate that the book
constituted fair use of the show.178 The court dismissed the experts'
arguments, however, because, as Judge Denise Cote later put it, "the
court did not require the testimony of experts to conclude that a
multiple-choice trivia book was not exactly the same thing as a
sophisticated critique of the show."179
It seems, then, that courts view transformativeness from the
perspective of the lay observer or, where the court is uncomfortable
playing the lay observer in the context of visual art, from the
perspective of the artist-defendant. Given the degree of visual literacy
required to identify transformativeness in appropriation art, courts
should specify that expert testimony is relevant to this determination,
just as the Arnstein court did for probative similarity.
In doing so, courts could comfortably rely on standards that are
already in place for expert testimony on art in other contexts. As Judge
Cote has pointed out, there is no need for special treatment of expert
testimony in copyright cases when the Federal Rules of Evidence
already provide a simple standard for the admissibility of expert
opinions. Judge Cote has proposed that rather than attempting to
make sense of the distinction in Arnstein v. Porter, judges faced with
infringement actions should instead rely on the standard set forward
by Rule 702, which states that an expert may testify if "specialized
177. Id.
178. 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Cote, supra note 22, at 236-37 (describing the
testimony).
179. Cote, supra note 22, at 237.
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knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact at issue."180
As Judge Cote has suggested, district court judges following the
guidance of Rule 702 and its accompanying case law are "quite
capable of assessing the extent to which any proffered expert
testimony will assist the trier of fact."181 Although Judge Cote has
proposed that the Arnstein standard is no longer necessary,182 an
Arnstein-like statement that expert testimony is relevant to a
determination of transformativeness could serve an important
signaling function to courts. If a court were to state affirmatively that
transformativeness in the appropriation art context should be
considered from an expert's perspective, future courts would likely be
more willing to qualify experts under Rule 702, recognizing that
interpretation of appropriation art may require some expert guidance.
Once art experts are qualified, they may provide opinion testimony
on the question of transformativeness, relying on their familiarity
with art history and criticism. Although art experts are most often
used for factual inquiries such as value appraisals and
authentication,183 courts have already invited more subjective forms
of testimony from art experts in different areas of art law.
First, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 provides a special form of
moral rights protection against destruction for "work[s of visual art]
of recognized stature."184 The leading test1ss specifies that litigants
wishing to claim "recognized stature status" must prove:
(1) that the visual art in question has "stature," i.e. is viewed as
meritorious, and (2) that this stature is "recognized" by art
experts, other members of the artistic community, or by some
cross-section of society. In making this showing, plaintiffs
generally, but not inevitably, will need to call expert witnesses
to testify before the trier of fact.186
This test invites experts to testify as to whether a work is "viewed as
meritorious" and "recognized" as such in the art world. Experts could
provide similar testimony in the fair use context in order to
180. FED. R. EVID. 702. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993)
(conceiving of the district court as a gatekeeper for expert testimony); see also Kumbo Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999) (extending Daubert to testimony by non-scientific
experts).
181. Cote, supra note 22, at 238.
182. Id.
183. See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 75, at 1078-1100.
184. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2006).
185. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (citing Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part vacated in part rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
186. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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demonstrate that an appropriation artwork is "viewed as critical" or
"recognized" as transformative among art critics and other trained
observers.
Second, courts deciding whether or not artworks qualify as obscene
for purposes of First Amendment doctrine admit expert testimony as
to the "serious artistic value" of the work in question. In Miller v.
California, the Supreme Court held that one of the characteristics of
obscenity is that it "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value"187 Whether or not a work is of "serious artistic value" is to be
judged by national standards.188 Courts therefore allow experts to
testify on what such national standards are, so that juries are not
tethered to their own experiences (which would better reflect
"community standards") in evaluating artwork.189 Experts could fulfill
a similar function in fair use inquiry by speaking to a sort of critical
consensus surrounding artworks, thus freeing courts from the
uncomfortable business of exercising independent artistic judgment
while addressing more than just the artist's intention.
B. Benefits of Considering Transformativeness from the Perspective of
the Expert Witness
By evaluating transformativeness from the perspective of the expert
witness, courts could bring about two positive developments in the
law of copyright and appropriation art. First, if artist-defendants are
allowed to put on expert witnesses instead of providing their own
authorial narratives, courts will no longer be forcing intentionalist or
uninformed interpretations onto appropriation art. Second,
evaluating transformativeness from the perspective of a specialized
observer will broaden the First Amendment safeguard of fair use, thus
limiting chilling effects and ensuring that artists continue to produce
appropriation works.
With regard to the first benefit, it bears noting that since fair use is
an affirmative defense, defendants will have to call up experts on their
own behalf. This begs the question: How is an artist calling an expert
to the stand any less problematic than an artist testifying himself?
After all, one could say that an expert witness is merely the
mouthpiece of the party calling for his testimony. Yet there is a crucial
difference between an artist's statement of intent and a secondary
interpretation of his work that he happens to "endorse." The trouble
with courts' current overreliance on artists' testimony is that it takes
187. 413U.S. 15,24(1973).
188. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 499-501 (1987).
189. See David Greene, Is Anything Obscene Anymore? The Need for Expert Testimony To
Prove Lack ofSerious Artistic Value in Obscenity Cases, 10 NEXUs 171 (2005).
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away interpretative agency from critics and viewers and returns it to
the traditional "author"-a role that the appropriation artist does not
want to play. Treating transformativeness as an expert question
would move the locus of interpretation a degree away from the artist.
This shift would enable an artist who is notoriously inscrutable and
prefers to work through visual media alone, like Prince,190 to dismiss
the expert's opinion as not his own, even if he is the one calling the
expert to the stand. In this way, courts evaluating transformativeness
from the perspective of the trained art expert would benefit both
artists who wish to remain silent and courts themselves, which wish
to stay out of the business of making aesthetic judgments but are
currently failing at this endeavor by pushing intentionalism to the
fore.
From a First Amendment perspective, expert transformativeness
would widen the safety valve of fair use by permitting appropriations
that ordinary observers would not immediately identify as
transformative, as noted above. For instance, if the court in Rogers v.
Koons had been more receptive to expert testimony, Koons could have
called an expert to testify about how his sculpture had been received
in the critical community, and how it should be "read" in light of the
appropriation art tradition in which Koons works. The expert could
explain how a cheap and campy image for sale on a greeting card
exemplified the culture of commodity kitsch that Koons critically
reexamined, as well as how critics like Foster have located Koons's
work within the art theoretical discourse about commodity culture. 191
Making the fair use safeguard more inclusive would respond to the
common criticism that transformative fair use is underprotective of
First Amendment values. Tushnet, for instance, has argued that
nontransformative appropriations also have free speech values
attached to them, and that courts should "recognize that many kinds
of uses of copyrighted material may be justified, not just uses that put
a critical spin on a prior work."192 Treating transformativeness as an
expert question does not go all the way in satisfying Tushnet's
concerns, of course, but it is certainly preferable to defining
transformativeness from the perspective of the ordinary observer,
which would exclude certain nonobvious transformations, as in the
district court's decision in Cariou v. Prince.
190. See Cat Weaver, Law vs. Art Criticism: judging Appropriation Art, HYPERALLERGIC (May 5,
2011), http://hyperallergic.com/23589/judging-appropriation-art/ (quoting an audience
member at a Volunteer Lawyer for the Arts event about the Cariou v. Prince litigation who stated
that Prince "has made a name out of being inscrutable" and for this reason "by his own
traditional practice ... could not comment on what he's doing").
191. See FOSTER, supra note 113, at 108.
192. Tushnet, supra note 23, at 587.
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Expanding the First Amendment safeguard of fair use could also
reduce chilling effects. As noted above, Fairey settled the AP's suit
against him in large part because he was concerned that the court
would not have "a sufficiently sophisticated understanding" of his
work.193 If artists like Fairey fear that courts will not understand their
artistic practice, they could draw comfort from a system that
encourages experts to point out and explain artistic nuances to the
trier of fact. This development would help to ensure that
appropriation artists continue their artistic practices without unduly
fearing liability for legitimate transformations.
Finally, treating fair use as an expert question would guarantee the
integrity of artists' appropriative gestures in a way that a voluntary or
compulsory licensing scheme, for instance, could not. Some
commentators have suggested that appropriation artists who wish to
avoid legal liability should simply use licensing agreements to obtain
permission ex ante from the artists whose works they copy.194
Although licenses can be costly, they are probably not more costly
than falling back on expert transformativeness, which would require
artists to pay experts called in their defense. As has already been
explained, however, permission weakens the effectiveness of
appropriation as a strategy for critical discourse. Relying on fair use to
protect transformative uses ex post, in contrast, does not compromise
the essential nature of appropriation ex ante.
Allowing artists to forego pursuing a license in order to preserve
the integrity of their commentary may seem unduly permissive. After
all, artists are not ordinarily entitled to violate laws of general
applicability in order to "make a statement." Graffiti artists, for
instance, are often prosecuted for vandalism, despite the fact that
their artworks are sometimes hailed as critical commentaries on
contemporary society. Renowned street artist Banksy keeps his
identity secret, presumably to avoid prosecution,195 even while he
gains international renown and critical acclaim for his work196 One
might argue that an appropriation artist who makes an unlicensed use
of a copyrighted work should be equally subject to liability, and that
free speech values do not counsel any more in favor of the unlicensed
appropriator than they do in favor of the graffiti artist. Yet the crucial
difference is that vandalism laws, and other laws of general
193. Fisher et al., supra note 68, at 274.
194. See, e.g., Carlin, supra note 30, at 141-43 (providing a model licensing agreement).
195. See Mark Oliver, Another Kick to the Wall, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2005, 5:08 A.M.),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2005/nov/30/anotherkickonl.
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applicability, do not contain intentional First Amendment safeguards
like fair use. Copyright is not the ordinary generally applicable law; it
is the "engine of free expression."197 The requirement to purchase a
license is intended to support the copyright holder's monopoly right,
but that monopoly right is already substantively limited by fair use, by
the Copyright Act's own terms.198
C Limits of Expert Transformativeness as a Solution
Evaluating transformativeness from the perspective of the expert
trained in art criticism and theory raises a number of practical and
substantive concerns. From a practical perspective, calling experts to
the stand can be costly, which may unduly benefit artist-defendants
with deep pockets. Substantively speaking, turning
transformativeness into an expert question will require courts to
articulate standards for evaluating expert testimony, and the problem
remains of how to clearly delineate a transformative fair use from
mere infringement.
Notably, inviting expert testimony on transformativeness is not the
same as requiring it, and some defendants may be able to successfully
claim the fair use defense without calling an expert to the stand. For
the reasons discussed above, however, many artists may perceive
benefits to relying on expert testimony rather than advancing a
favorable authorial narrative. Yet because experts are costly, this
framework might favor defendants with more substantial resources.
Typically, these will be more established artists, such as Koons, who
by the time of the Rogers litigation was routinely selling artworks for
prices in excess of $100,000.199 Advantaging well-known artists may
seem undesirable considering copyright's mandate to "promote
Progress."200 Yet it is important to note that more established artists
are more likely to get sued in the first place, for two very simple
reasons: plaintiffs are more likely to find out about their
appropriations, and established artists have deeper pockets that will
seem more promising to plaintiffs hoping to recover damages.201
From a substantive perspective, the proposal to treat
transformativeness as an expert question raises different concerns. A
major problem that carries over from ordinary observer fair use
inquiry is how to draw the line between a transformative fair use and
infringement, given how necessarily subjective this question is. This
197. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003).
198. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
199. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992).
200. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
201. Other artists, however, may get cease and desist letters.
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problem is virtually impossible to solve. A specific version of the issue,
however, may arise from the fact that an expert called up by a
defendant might be unwilling to testify that the defendant's work is
not transformative. In fact, contemporary art theory indicates that
even direct copies, like Levine's re-photographs, are transformations,
so it is difficult to imagine a case in which an expert would not say a
work is transformative. Indeed, one might well argue that
contemporary art theory does not distinguish between "legitimate"
and "illegitimate" appropriations at all. Appropriation art stands in
clear tension with the very premises of fair use, which distinguishes
"criticism" from mere "copying"-a distinction without a difference to
appropriation artists and, potentially, their experts. The fear, then, is
that a defendant's expert will not "play by the rules" of the copyright
game that he rejects in the first place.
The effects of this concern can be mitigated, however, if courts
develop careful standards for how expert testimony should be treated.
For instance, a court might provide juries with instructions indicating
that expert testimony must clearly indicate that a work is "highly"
transformative. Courts could also consider the strength of expert
testimony at the remedy stage, perhaps permitting damages but not
injunctive relief where an expert raises a plausible-but not
completely convincing-claim of transformativeness. Finally,
plaintiffs may also call up competing experts to testify that a
defendant's work is not transformative, and the trier of fact-whether
it be a jury, or a judge deciding a summary judgment motion-can
weigh the competing expert testimonies. Doing so will of course
require the trier of fact to exercise some independent judgment, but it
will have a more informed foundation on which to make this decision
than if it were considering transformativeness from the perspective of
the lay observer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conflict between copyright law and appropriation art is, at
heart, ultimately irreconcilable. Copyright and appropriation are
fundamentally opposing forces. Copyright explicitly exalts originality;
appropriation actively challenges it. Copyright grants property rights
in artworks; appropriation treats artworks as universally owned
components of our visual environment. As Lisa Petruzzelli put it,
"Appropriation art is, in essence, infringement for a reason."202
My goal in this paper has not been to devise a perfect system of
202. Lisa Petruzzelli, Copyright Problems in Postmodern Art, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL'Y 115, 115 (1995).
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copyright that will simultaneously protect original authors'
proprietary interests and appropriation artists' freedom of
expression. As Tushnet has explained, "Some forms of copyright law
are better for free speech than others, no doubt, but any system of
copyright will suppress speech, and some of that speech will be quite
valuable in constitutional terms."203 Instead, my aims in this project
have been much more modest. I wish only to call attention to the thus
far unacknowledged fact that when courts rely on artists' testimony in
order to avoid artistic interpretation, they are actually taking sides
with intentionalists in the art world debate over interpretative agents.
My proposal for expert testimony on transformativeness, likewise, is
intended only to solve this narrow problem. But it is my hope that
treating transformativeness as an expert question will solve the
particular art-theoretical and First Amendment harms that arise from
the problem of intentionalism, while still providing a firmer
foundation for artistic interpretation than would the "reasonable
observer" test from Cariou v. Prince. This development would be just
one small step toward ensuring that copyright law treats
appropriation art in a manner consistent with its constitutional
mandate to "promote Progress of Science and useful Arts."204
203. Tushnet, supra note 23, at 547.
204. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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Errata
Vol. 25, No. 2. Aaron T. Knapp, "Law's Revolution: Benjamin
Austin and the Spirit of '86," p. 323.
The editorial board is responsible for having changed a passage to a
form that conflicts with the author's intended meaning. In published form
the passage reads:
As middlemen who had inserted themselves between the people
and the law, holding the former for ransom, lawyers epitomized
representation's most fearsome anti-republican aspects.
The passage is hereby changed to read:
As middlemen who had inserted themselves between the people
and the law, holding the latter for ransom, lawyers epitomized
representation's most fearsome anti-republican aspects.
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